The paper elicits a mechanism by which that private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy. The key ingredient is that monetary policy is non-targeted. The ex-post bene ts from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage, while the distortion costs are to a large extent xed. This insight has important consequences. First, private interest-rate exposure is highly sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. Second, private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest-rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity. Third, optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent.
market) for their funding. Some banks have also increased their dependence on markets; the standard illustration is Northern Rock, a UK mortgage bank, which prior to its bailout relied on short-term wholesale markets for 75% of its funding.
A second factor contributing to the reliance on wholesale markets is the overall shift from a bank-based system to a market-based one. The expanding so-called \shadow banking system" (conduits, hedge funds, investment banks, monolines) has engaged in substantial transformation, and unlike commercial banks, could not prevail itself of stable insured deposits. Mutual funds are under the threat of severe redemptions and may well face liquidity shortages as well.
Adding subprime borrowers, who are heavily dependent on high housing prices and, for those with ARMs, on low short-term interest rates, and highly leveraged corporations, the overall picture is one of a fragile economic environment that has become overly sensitive to interest rate risk. The paper's key insight is that private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the policy reaction. Monetary policy, de ned here as the public sector exerting a downward pressure on interest rates, is a prototypical non-targeted public policy. It rescues those who depend on low interest rates, but its other bene ts and costs apply to the entire economy. As a consequence, the more economic actors exhibit a substantial interest-rate vulnerability, the more the state has to engage in active monetary policy. The lack of targeting implies that one is more likely to be rescued by monetary policy, the higher the overall economy's sensitivity to interest rate conditions. This central insight has four immediate corollaries. First, private interest-rate exposure is highly sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. Second, private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest-rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity, a conclusion that runs afoul of the pattern predicted by standard modeling focusing on the microeconomics of corporate nance. Third, optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent, but not for the standard, in ation-bias reason; the central bank would like to commit not to lower the interest rates, but may ex post face the fait accompli of excessive short-term wholesale markets exposure. Fourth, and related to the previous point, macro-prudential supervision is called for.
The Model
The following stylized model illustrates the basic points. There are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2 and two groups of economic agents, of mass 1 each: entrepreneurs and consumers (investors).
Consumers. Consumers derive utility from consumption path fc 0 ; c 1 ; c 2 g
where u is increasing and concave. They have \large" endowments e 0 ; e 1 at dates 0 and 1.
Entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have utility function
where c t is their date-t consumption. Their only endowment is their wealth A at date 0. Their technology set exhibits constant returns to scale. At date 0 they choose their investment scale I. If still productive at date 2 (see below), this investment then delivers 1 I, of which 0 I, is pledgeable to investors where 0 < 1. In practice, an exposure to funding liquidity risk can stem from multiple factors: a reliance on securitization, a lack of hedging, or the failure to hoard liquid assets or to secure lines of credit. We here capture these various possibilities through a metaphor: The entrepreneur chooses at date 0 between a costly but safe technology, that never requires additional funds at date 1, and a cheaper but risky technology, that is vulnerable to liquidity shocks.
Under the safe technology, the entrepreneur is never exposed to a shock. The cost of investing at scale i is Ki where K > 1. The risky technology is cheaper. The date-0 investment cost is I for investment scale I. However, with probability of \distress" 1 , one unit of reinvestment is needed per unit of initial investment in order for investment to be productive at date 2; otherwise the investment is discarded and there is no liquidation value. With probability , the rm is \intact" and needs no reinvestment at date 1. For simplicity, we will assume that the liquidity-need realizations are independent across rms choosing the risky technology. Finally we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1:
This assumption will ensure that entrepreneurs nd it preferable to opt for the safe technology if they anticipate that no monetary bailout will take place, and to opt for the risky technology if they anticipate that a monetary bailout will take place. 
where the following assumption holds, which guarantees that reinvesting in distressed rm is socially optimal:
Assumption 2:
The potential costs and bene ts of accommodative monetary policy can be understood as follows. On the one hand, lowering the real interest rate below one introduces a wedge between the intertemporal rate of substitution of consumers and the rate of return on the storage technology. On the other hand, it makes both investment in distressed rms at date 1 and investment in the risky technology more attractive at date 0 more attractive.
Our modelling of monetary policy deserves some comments. To simplify the exposition and focus on our speci c contribution, we have built a real model with no money balances in our model, no sticky prices and no imperfect competition. Yet we argue that our modelling of monetary policy captures a key feature of monetary policy in New-Keynesian models.
There 
The second inequality in Assumption 1 ensures that choosing the risky technology allows for a larger scale I > i : The higher the cost disadvantage K 1 (1 ) 0 of the safe technology, the larger the investment scale disparity. The entrepreneurs trades o this larger scale against the lower probability of success + (1 )y involved in the risky technology.
The latter depends on the stance of monetary policy. The higher the probability y of a monetary bailout, the larger the probability of success of a risky project, and the more attractive the risky technology.
The equilibrium is entirely pinned down by this condition. If (3) 
Limited Commitment and Monetary Bailouts
In the previous Section, we assumed that the central bank committed to monetary policy at date 0: In this Section, we depart from this assumption. Rather, we assume that monetary policy is set at date 1; without commitment. Without commitment, our environment has the following structure. We can represent the policy of central bank as a programming problem.
There is a single state variable. This state variable is a simple transformation of the average action taken by rms at date 0: The relative expected payo s to rms from the di erent actions depend on the anticipated policy by the central bank.
The state variable I 1 x(1 )I is the aggregate reinvestment need of distressed rms.
The policy of the central bank is the date 1 interest rate. The action taken by rms at date 0 is to invest in a safe technology or a risky technology. The aggregate reinvestment need I 1 of distressed rms at date 1 is increasing in the number of rms investing in the risky technology at date 0.
The Central Bank's decision. At date 1; the central bank either sets the interest rate at the laissez-faire level of 1 or at the monetary bailout level 0 < 1: Ex-post, it is optimal to set R = 0 if and only if the welfare gains of a monetary bailout on entrepreneurs
( 1 0 ) (1 ) I 1 exceed the welfare losses on consumers V (1; 0) V ( 0 ; (1 )I 1 ) : This condition can be rewritten aŝ
The left hand side of condition (5) An intuition that accords with our title is that the central banker's put is closer to the money, the more leveraged the economy. As a result, the entrepreneurs' payo is more convex, reinforcing the incentives for risk-taking and leverage.
Equilibrium. Note, rst, that if the entrepreneurs opt for the safe technology, then I 1 = 0 and it is optimal for the central bank to set R = 1. Hence the laissez-faire equilibrium with y = 0 and x = 0 analyzed in Section 3 is still an equilibrium under no commitment.
Under a stronger condition than Assumption 2, namely,
then the systematic monetary bailout equilibrium with y = 1 and x = 1 analyzed in Section 3 is also an equilibrium. 3 . Furthermore, this equilibrium Pareto-dominates the safe strategy equilibrium from the point of view of entrepreneurs. We will henceforth assume that when multiple equilibria coexist, the (entrepreneurs') Pareto superior one prevails.
Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Conditions. The possibility of multiple equilibria, one with y = 0 and x = 0; and one with y = 1 and x = 1 underscores that equilibrium risk-taking, leverage and monetary policy can be very sensitive to aggregate macroeconomic conditions ( ).
4
Exposure to funding liquidity risk and monetary bailouts thus arise if condition (6) is satis ed. We therefore conclude that they are more likely when: (i) the corporate sector receives more weight in the state's objective function ( high) and (ii) liquidity shocks are more likely ( low).
While (i) is rather obvious, (ii) deserves more comments. Note that under commitment to laissez-faire, the safe technology is more likely to be chosen (1 > K) if is small.
Nonetheless, without commitment, the policy reaction implies that the rms may take on more risk (x = 1) when bad news accrue ( decreases). When macroeconomic condition deteriorate ( decreases), the central banker's put is closer to the money. As a result, the entrepreneurs' payo is more convex, inducing further risk-taking.
Time-Inconsistency. We can also comment on time consistency. When both (4) and (6) hold, the optimal policy under commitment is laissez-faire while under no commitment, systematic monetary bailouts occur. In this case, the optimal policy features a form of time-inconsistency. Welfare is higher when the central bank commits at date 0 not to lower interest rates at date 1: This deters entrepreneurs from engaging in risky-projects, which is socially optimal as long as (4) sub-optimal, both from the entrepreneurs' private perspective and from a social perspective of the central bank, to undertake a risky project that will be discontinued in case of distress.
Second, in case a monetary bailout takes place, it is always optimal, both privately and socially, to undertake a risky project.
Indeed, it is enough for supervision to ensure that the aggregate amount of investment in the risky technology is capped by I where
This ensures that the bene ts of implementing a monetary bailout are always less than its costs, which in turn induces the entrepreneur to limit their leverage by opting for the safe technology.
Conclusion
The paper elicits a mechanism by which that private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy. The key ingredient is that monetary policy is non-targeted. The ex-post bene ts from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage, while the distortion costs are to a large extent xed. We showed that this insight has important consequences. First, private interest-rate exposure is highly sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. Second, private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest-rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity. Third, optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent. Fourth, and related to the previous point, macro-prudential supervision is called for.
These insights are not speci c to interest rate policy. The less targeted the policy under consideration, the more relevant our analysis. For example, some of the various facilities recently introduced by the Fed can be seen as a forms of subsidies, which are not targeted to the extent that they can be partly appropriated by agents who are not distressed or carry a lower weight in the central bank's welfare function. An important empirical question to interpret the recent events in the light of our model is whether these facilities are more targeted than the Fed funds rate. On the theoretical front, it is worth enriching the model to allow for a ner determination of the trade-o s underlying the choice between di erent policy instruments.
